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THE PLIGHT OF THE GENETICALLY HANDICAPPED NEWBORN:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Confusion and controversy surround efforts to re-evaluate and, thus,
redefine the extent to which governmental intrusion should be allowed in
the doctor-patient relationship vis-a-vis the treatment or non treatment
of genetically handicapped, at risk infants. The purpose of this
article is to present a succinct comparative analysis of the medico-
legal posture in Britain and the United States and from this analysis
to develop a construct to aid the physician and the family in making
decisions concerning the administration or the withholding of treatment
for geneticaially defective newborns.
1. The Influence of Federal Legislation in the U.S.A.
Over seven thousand hospitals in the United States receive federal
funding for various parts of their administration. 1 Failure to provide
medical or surgical assistance to newly born infants with severe birth
defects could well violate those civil rights conferred upon all citizens,
and especially children, under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 19732 as
amended by the 1978 Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Service and Develop-
mental Disabilities Act. 3 The Act defines a handicapped individual as
one who has either a physical or mental disability which in turn const-
itutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment 4 and who has
a physical or a mental impairment which limits substantially one or more
of the major life activities. 5 It specifically declares that no handi-
capped citizen of the United States, solely for reasons of a handicap,
will "be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance ..... 6
On March 22, 1983, in a subsequent federal regulatory scheme steps
were taken to ensure that there be no discrimination against defective
newborns: prominently displayed signs in maternity wards and in other
parts of hospitals would announce a non-discriminatory policy for handi-
capped infants and a prohibition against the denial of good or customary
medical care (which was not defined) was set in operation; anonymous
tipsters were encouraged to call a "Handicapped Infant Hotline" at the
United States Department of Health and Human Services in Washington, D.C.,
if they knew of any such acts of discrimination.7 When challenged, these
regulations, dubbed by the popular press as the "Baby Doe" regulations,
were voided by a federal court as being arbitrary and capricious.8
"New" regulations, redrafted in light of this challenge, were
submitted for public comment on July 5, 1983, 9 and promulgated in final
form on January 12, 1984.10 In essence, these rules declare that
where medical care is clearly beneficial it should always be provided to
11
a handicapped newborn. 1 Although recognizing a presumption should
always be in favor of treatment, reasonable medical judgments will be
respected regarding treatment and nourishment so long as such decisions
to forego or withhold are not made on the basis of present or anticipated
physical or mental impairments. 12 Thus, decisions not to commence futile
treatment which would be of no medical benefit to the infant and which
would present a risk of potential harm will be respected.1 3
Infant Care Review Committees are encouraged, although not mandated,
to be structured in the seven thousand health care institutions receiving
federal financial assistance. 1 4 These Committees will not only be charged
with developing and recommending institutional policies concerning the
withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment for infants with life-
threatening conditions, but will provide counsel in specific cases under
present review.1 5 Adhering to various Principles approved by such groups
as The American Academy of Pediatrics and The National Association of
Children's Hospitals, the ICRC's will conduct their operations under the
premise that where medical care is clearly beneficial, it should always be
provided.16 Although recognizing that a presumption should always be
indulged in favor of treatment according to the Principles, reasonable
medical judgment will be respected regarding treatment and nourishment
so long as decisions to forego or withhold are not made on the basis of
present or anticipated physical or mental impairments. 1 7 Presumably, the
validity of the test of reasonableness will depend upon the facts of each
case that arises.
Informational notices of the application of the Federal Law, posted
where nurses and other medical professionals may view them, are required
to include a statement of non-discrimination of health services (consist-
ent with the specific provisions of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
1973) on the basis of handicap,of a size no smaller than five by seven
inches,and list a twenty-four hour toll free "hot line" telephone number
at the United States Department of Health and Human Services and/or state
child protective services agency where violations of the Act may be
reported.1 8
Perhaps as important as the new Rules is an Appendix, "Guidelines
Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants", which, while not
independently establishing rules of conduct, are to be recognized as
"interpretive guidelines" designed to assist in interpreting the application
of Section 504.19 Considering Appendix C (a) (1) - (3) and C (a) (5) (ii)
(iii) (iv), one finds a recognition that where any of the following
situational standards operate no discrimination will be acknowledged and,
thus, no federal intervention undertaken:
(1) Where treatment would be futile according to reasonable medical
judgment;
(2) Where treatment would be unlikely to succeed given the complexity
of the case; or otherwise would not be of medical benefit to the
infant; or
(3) Where it is recognized that a particular mode of treatment would
probably not succeed or might cause harm.
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It is interesting to observe that as of December 1, 1983, of the forty-
nine cases of alleged discrimination in treatment of seriously handicapped
newborns in federally assisted maternity wards, "no case resulted in a
finding of discriminatory withholding of medical care".
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2. The British Judicial Posture
The Sunday Times of December 4, 1983, carried an absorbing article
concerning the plight of handicapped newborns in the United States and
raised the question whether a similar condition could ever obtain in
Britain. 22 Only time, of course, can provide a definitive answer; but
two important cases perhaps indicate a particular judicial attidue to the
issue.
The first of these cases is In Re. B (a minor) which was decided in
1981.23 The facts showed that B, a female child, was born suffering not
only from Down's syndrome but also an intestinal blockage and would require
surgery in order to relieve the obstruction if she were to live for
more than a few days. Although the surgery provided no guarantee of long
life- in fact, there was a possibility that B might die within a few
months - the evidence pointed to the fact that she could have an expectancy
of normal mongol life anywhere from twenty to thirty years if the
operation was successful. Her parents decided that in "the kindest ...
interests of the child"2 4 , no operation should be performed. Accordingly
they advised the doctors of this decision and it was respected. The
local authority thereupon made the infant a ward of the court and sought
an order authorizing the operation be performed by other surgeons. The
lower court respected the parental decision and refused to order the
surgery. On appeal by the local authority, the Court of Appeal reversed
that decision and held that parental wishes were secondary to what was in
the best interests of the child. The parents argued that, owing to the
fact that the child would be severely handicapped both mentally and
physically, no evaluation of the quality of life of a mongoloid during its
predicted short life span could be properly made. The Court determined
that insofar as a "happy life" could be provided for a mongoloid, baby B
was entitled to that life.
2 5
Noting that a judicial decision in a case of this nature requires
the court to consider the child's interests as well as the views of the parents
and their doctors, the court acknowledged that "at the end of the day it
devolves on this court in this particular instance to decide whether the
life of this child is so awful that in effect the child must be
condemned to die, or whether the life of this child is so imponderable
that it would be wrong for her to be condemned to die".26 The court
continued, stating, that "There may be cases, I know not, of severe
proved damages where the future is so certain and where the life of the
child is so bound to be full of pain and suffering that the court might
be driven to a different conclusion".
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Of interest also is Regina v Arthur, an unreported case decided at
the Leicester Crown Court on November 5, 1981) three months after the
In re B decision. Here, a mongoloid was born on June 28, 1980, and there-
upon rejected by his parents. The consultant pediatrician, Dr. Leonard
Arthur, presecribed "nursing care only" (i.e. a regime which included no
food) for the child and prescribed regular doses of the drug DF118 for
purposes of sedation. Originally Dr. Arthur was charged with murder, but
during the course of the trial the charge was reduced to attempted murder.
The doctor was subsequently acquitted by the jury. In his slummation, the
Judge referred to In re. B and indicated that it was lawful to treat
a baby with a sedating drug and to offer no further care by way of food
or drugs or surgery provided two criteria were met: that the child is
"irreversibly disabled" and that it is rejected by its parents. Thus,
the Arthur case seems to suggest the issue of treatment of a severely
handicapped newborn child is a private matter between physician and
parent and it is doubful whether this verdict can be reconciled with
In ReB .28 While it is clear the Arthur verdict does not legitimize the
use of drugs in order to accelerate death, it is unclear whether it
establishes the legality of a policy of nontreatment or whether
"holding procedures" are valid in all cases
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3. The American Judicial Posture
Baby Jane Doe was born on Long Island, New York, on October 11, 1983,
with spina bifida and an abnormally small head which was swelling with
excess fluid. After consultation with physicians and members of the
clergy, her parents refused to allow corrective surgery. If successful,
the operation might have allowed the infant to live some twenty years but
in a state of retardation, constant pain, an epileptic, and paralyzed
below the waist.30
The highest court in the State, the Court of Appeals, decided that
the parents decision must be respected. It refused to articulate the
circumstances which would trigger judicial protection of an infant of this
type merely observing that there may be occasions where it would be
appropriate to intervene. Rather, it noted that the Legislature had
designed a statutory scheme designed specifically for protecting children
from abuse and, at the same time safeguarding familial privacy and
relationships and that this procedure would be adhered to unless the
Legislature, again, decided to amend the process.
3 1
Although refusing to deal directly with the need to establish
criteria for validating decision making in cases of this nature, a key
lower court decision in New York had indicated that only if there is a
"reasonable chance" to lead a fulfilling and useful life, parental
inaction regarding needed surgical intervention will not be permitted.32
The very first Baby Doe case to be found and popularized by the press,
involved a six pound baby boy born with Down's syndrome in Bloomington,
Indiana, in 1982 who lived but six days. His death precipitated a national
re-thinking of issues of infanticide,parental decision-making and power
under the Common Law to exercise jurisdiction over the care of children
and perhaps the most central issue of all: whether quality of life
standards are more significant and fundamental than principles of
sanctity of life. In addition to being born a mongoloid, with consquent
mental retardation, "Baby Doe" (as he was dubbed by the press) had a
malformed wsophagus together with multiple phyiscal problems. The
aesophagal condition prevented food from reaching the stomach. Rather
than authorize corrective surgery, the parents chose to authorize a
withholding of food and medical treatment, save pain killers, from their
son. The Monroe County Circuit Court issued two orders preventing
interference with the parental decision. These were upheld by the Supreme
Court of Indiana. Before an emergency appeal could be taken to the
Supreme Court of the U.S.A., Baby Doe died.
The English Court of Appeal precedent and the United States cases
suggest a principle of "substituted judgment". Thus, the Court will
seek to place itself in the position of the infant in extremis and
determine whether, given its medical condition, it would wish to live
under present or altered conditions - and whether a
meaningful or qualitative life could be achieved. Inherent in the
effectiveness of application of such a principle is the employment of a
cost-benefit analysis or balancing test. Stated simply, the costs
(social, economic) of maintaining life are weighed against the benefits
(religious, ethical, spiritual, etc.) of preserving it.
4. Seeking a Classification
The underlying principle of application should be to minimize
suffering and maximize the qualitative potential for fulfilling human
relationships and thereby promoting a purposeful life for the infant at
risk.3 4 The application of this principle, depends solely upon the
facts of each situation as it arises. To have an unyielding a priori
standard of mandated care for all seriously handicapped newborns would
be unjust for the infant itself, and would cause undue suffering. It
would be equally unjust and harsh for its parents and it would present
an unreasonably heavy burden to society in terms of use of scarce
medical resources. Efforts must be made to ensure, however, that if a
class is structured and labeled, "disabled", it is drawn as narrowly as
possible and as strictly defined as possible. 35 Thus, the overriding
issue, then, is whether a construct can in fact be designed in such a
manner as to assist the supervising physicians, the family and their
religious counsellors and the state (when involved in defining the
parameters of a class of nonsalvageable defective newborns?
At various times it has been suggested that the capacity for
consciousness, 36 social interaction, human relationships (and expecially
love) 37 and rational thought were the four most important considerations
in determining who was to be placed in the "non-salvageable" classific-
ation.38 The importance of each capacity in the heirarchy of the class-
ification depends, very obviously, upon one's particular social, ethical,
religious and philosophical perspective. One leading ethicist has
stated that, "... the warmth of human interaction, the love of one person
for another, the emotional bonding that links people in moral communities
does not require a capacity for consciousness".
39
What is crucial in assessing these various capacities, no matter
which would be regarded as more important by a philosopher-ethicist, is
the actual physical condition of the handicapped newborn. If some
consensus could be reached that certain genetic afflictions are not
correctable by surgery or medical treatment in a way which would promote
a valuable life free of intense pain and suffering, then better, more
informed decision-making could be considered by the family and its
expanded circle, aided by the medical recognition or determination that
the at risk infant was one member of a classification for whom it would
be inhumane to sustain life.
The most constructive attempt to develop a classification or construct
may be found in the results of a study undertaken at Children's Hospital
in Sheffield, England, in the early 1970's where a list of six defects
were found and agreed upon as being of such a nature as to preclude the
possibility of an independent, dignified life or one in which meaningful
interpersonal relations could be enjoyed. They are:
1. Thoracolumbar or thoracolumbosacral lesion.
2. Gross paralysis with a neurologic segmental level at L 3.
3. Kyphosis or scoliosis,
4. Gross hydrocephalus with a head circumference at least 2 cm
above the 90th percentile related to birth weight.
5. Other gross congenital defects, such as cyanotic heart disease.
6. Intracranial birth injury.40
Conclusions
Child protection laws are, of course necessary. Their design and
promulgation by the government are crucial if standards of equal
protection for all its citizens, regardless of age or physical stature,
are to be assured. It is a dangerously thin line to tread between familial
privacy in decision making matters and government intervention.4 1 The
judiciary, when called upon to evaluate cases of alleged abuse of handi-
capped newborns, can be aided by a close working partnership with the
medical profession in seeking to decide when the withholding of needed
medical or surgical treatment would be in the infant's best interests,
and in the interest of others immediately concerned.4 2 This is a proper
object of judicial inquiry. The classification for decision making
proposed herein is of value not only to the courts, but also to the parents
of a handicapped infant who, themselves, must confront the initial decision
regarding sanctified qualitative living. Given the medically agreed upon
components of this modest construct, and the laws already in place
protecting children from abuse,4 3 there is no need for direct government
involvement or intrusion into the sensitive area of familial autonomy by
way of statutory regulatory schemes like the one presently in operation
in the U.S.A.
Postscript
Because of judicial uncertainty in defining with clarity the role of
health care providers and of parents in dealing with handicapped, at risk
newborns, the United States Congress sought to amend during its 98th
session, provisions of The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and
the Adoption Reform Act of 1978.4 4 The reform was designed to make the
withholding of medical treatment from handicapped babies with life
threatening conditions the basis for an action of child neglect and abuse
at the state level. The Act was subsequently passed and signed into law
on October 9, 1984, b President Reagan and entitled, "The Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984" . The Secretary of Health and Human Services
promul ated new regulations designed to implement this law on December 10,
1984.V
While the basic policy of these model guidelines is to prevent the
withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with
life-threatening conditions, the guidelines specifically do not apply and
thus, do not mandate a course of treatment, where a physician's reasonable
judgment is that; the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
where treatment would merely prolong death; not be effective in ameliorat-
ing or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or
otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant or - finally -
such treatment would be "virtually futile in terms of the survival of the
infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances [which] would be
inhumane". 48
Only time will provide the ultimate test of whether this scheme
will be accepted by the American courts or challenged as an unwarranted
intrusion into familial decision-making. It can be but hoped that a
final chapter can be written and achnowledged by all elements of society
soon and thus provide a final conclusion to a painful dilemma for the
parents of handicapped at risk newborns and their attending physicians.
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